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“It’s a model, not the model.” – 
Dani Rodrik (2018, p. 276) 
1 Introduction 
Recently, a number of high-profile economists have weighed in on the question of 
how highly idealized models can be used to provide explanations and influence 
policymaking (Sugden 2000, 2009, 2011; Gilboa et al. 2014; Rodrik 2015, 2018). 
Among these, Dani Rodrik stands out for his particular emphasis on the importance 
of model diversity within economics. Rather than falsifying models, economists actively 
seek to expand our ‘library of models’, selecting the appropriate one for a specific 
context and purpose. Progress, Rodrik (2015) argues, is thus to be found not in the 
vertical replacement of old models with better ones in a motion towards the one true, 
perfect, and general model with universal applicability, but rather a horizontal 
expansion of our modeling toolkit addressing aspects of social phenomena 
previously unexplored. Yet, Rodrik himself recognizes the possible objections to his 
proposal: 
The multiplicity of models is economics’ strength. But for a discipline with 
scientific pretensions, the multiplicity can also be viewed as problematic. What 
kind of a science has a different model for everything? Can a collection of 
cases, to use Gilboa and his coauthors’ analogy, really amount to a science? 
– Dani Rodrik (2015, p. 72–73) 
Rodrik thinks that these objections lose their bite once we realize that models are 
equipped with contextual information and background conditions regarding their 
appropriate use. Indeed, he goes so far as to argue that they “come with explicit user’s 
guides—-teaching notes on how to apply them” (p. 73). While I think that Rodrik is 
overly optimistic here and model-world relationships are even in practice often 
severely underdetermined, there is something fundamentally right about Rodrik’s call 
for model diversity that philosophers of models have failed to sufficiently 
acknowledge - i.e. the pluralist nature of scientific modeling. 
In a recent special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology dedicated to 
Rodrik’s Economics Rules, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) argue that the 
plurality and diversity of models might lead to an embarrassment of riches.1 While models 
are good, and more models arguably better, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni are 
worried about the conditions under which such “progress would turn into the 
production of non-processable white noise” (p. 273); i.e. the thought that our 
 
1 A popular idiom intended to signify that there is too much of a good thing. 
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modeling library could become so large that choice becomes impossible. Rodrik 
himself recognizes but ultimately dismisses this problem based on his idea of a user’s 
guide: “in any specific setting, we can discriminate, at least in principle, between 
models that are helpful and models that aren’t” (p. 73). I argue that reply won’t work, 
but it will take more to show why. This is the target matter of Section 2. 
Yet, despite the inadequacy of Rodrik’s response, the present article is intended 
to debunk Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni’s embarrassment of riches argument 
(henceforth abbreviated as EoR). While they raise an important challenge to Rodrik’s 
account - i.e., the idea that we would be dealing with such a wealth of models that we 
could no longer choose among them - this should not be considered a problem for 
model pluralism as a tenable view of actual scientific practice, nor for model diversity 
as a measure of scientific progress. There is little to go by in Rodrik if one is looking 
into his work for a “complete account if one could even call it that” (Veit 2019a, p. 
108). After all, Rodrik (2018) does not intend his book to be a “treatise on economic 
methodology” (p. 276). Drawing on my own ‘model pluralism account’ (Veit 2019a), 
I argue that the EoR challenge can be debunked once model pluralism is properly 
understood as a thesis about the nature of science.2 This will occupy us for most of 
Section 3. Finally, I offer some guidance for policy making under model pluralism 
and conclude the discussion in Section 4. 
2 An Overabundance of Models 
As the epigraph is meant to indicate, there is a central message in Rodrik’s work that 
is about the elimination of a particularly harmful, yet widespread belief among 
economists. It is the still-dominant view that there is something like the perfect 
model that can solve all problems in economics, or at least within a particular domain 
of economics. Rodrik suggests the following formulation for this view: 
A model is an abstract, simplified setup that sheds light on the economy’s 
workings, by clarifying the relationship among exogenous determinants, 
endogenous effects, and intermediating processes. Economic science advances 
 
2 I initially developed the view largely in response to a perceived need in economics, psychology, and 
biology (sciences dealing with complexity) to embrace a wider range of models (see Veit 2019b), and 
defended an early version of this view in Veit (2019c). I have since applied model pluralism as a more 
general view about science to a wide range of phenomena such as cultural evolution in economics 
(Schlaile, Veit, & Boudry forthcoming), climate modeling (Ortmann & Veit 2021), autism (Chapman & 
Veit 2020a,b), cognitive enhancements (Veit et al. 2020), health and disease (Veit 2021, forthcoming), 
animal welfare (Veit & Browning 2020, forthcoming), consciousness (Browning & Veit 2021; Veit 2021c), 
and conceptual engineering more generally (Browning & Veit 2020b). It is now time to revisit my view 
within the economic modeling literature where it has been originally articulated, to address its biggest 
challenge (EoR), and explicate it as a general thesis about the nature of science. 
4 
by testing these models against reality, keeping those that do a good job and 
discarding the rest. 
– Dani Rodrik (2018, p. 276) 
While he has no qualms with the view presented in the first sentence, Rodrik is 
vehemently opposed to that of the second one. Here, the influence of contemporary 
philosophy of science is noticeable. The Popperian idea – that we just need to come 
up with better models that are more general than previous ones and seek to falsify 
the old ones – is still alive and well in many of the sciences. This, Rodrik thinks, is a 
fundamental mistake, and here he draws on a number of influential philosophers of 
science (and economics) such as Nancy Cartwright and Uskali Mäki, in order to ‘save’ 
economics from both its critics and its practitioners. 
The very idea that economists discard their models is illusionary, so claims 
Rodrik. The quote above is thus more of a representation of a popular myth among 
economists about economics than an actual truth - a normative view that fails to 
correspond to actual modeling practice, a problem that as I shall argue, likewise 
applies to the EoR problem introduced by Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni. 
Economics, Rodrik thinks, is in a dire hold between the critics of economics and 
economists themselves. Yet, he thinks both misunderstand the nature of economic 
modeling and subsequently tries to set them straight. Both got wrong what 
economists are actually doing - yes, even the economists themselves. The critics of 
economics are wrong when they suggest that highly idealized models are the reason 
for the supposed ‘failure of economics’. Economists on the other hand, Rodrik 
argues, are terrible defenders of their own discipline. They become strange 
bedfellows with outdated views in the philosophy of science such as those of Karl 
Popper and Milton Friedman, even though their own pluralist practice contradicts 
their apparent endorsement of these views. 
As Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) point out, Rodrik breaks here with 
an old tradition in economics that saw economic theorizing as the testing, verifying, 
and falsification of individual models. Instead, an alternative picture is offered 
according to which actual economists choose the right model for the right purpose. 
Model selection becomes a new and important ingredient. This picture nevertheless 
offers a moderate role for empirical testing in the evaluation of a model’s fit to its 
purpose and the real world. Testing is here a less formal procedure, something 
halfway between the practitioners’ idea that economics is engaging in simple 
falsification and the critics’ thought that it is merely applied math (Rosenberg 1992), 
thus “shield[ing] its models from empirical evidence altogether” (Grüne-Yanoff and 
Marchionni 2018, p. 266). 
Rodrik’s picture has been praised by a number of philosophers of economics 
as a more realistic picture of economics (Aydinonat 2018b,a; Mäki 2018; Kuorikoski 
and Lehtinen 2018; Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni 2018; Veit 2019a), yet there are 
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some significant lacunas regarding its details. What has been offered is an alternative 
- but one that needs to be refined and put to practice. In this, Aydinonat’s special 
issue in the Journal of Economic Methodology does an excellent job in doing the essential 
brick-laying for future work. Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) attempt this by 
formally spelling out the gaps in Rodrik’s account in detail. It is an attempt to provide 
an idealized model of Rodrik’s selection procedure which, as I will argue shortly, will 
ultimately prove unsuccessful. 
2.1 The Model Selection Model 
Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni’s explicit goal is to provide a formal model in order 
to investigate the conditions under which Rodrik’s account would fail to select a 
single model and thus lead to what they fear is an EoR. While Rodrik (2015) 
emphasizes modeling as a craft, rather than merely a logical analysis, their model 
nonetheless exposes a problem in Rodrik’s account. Their attempt to provide a more 
“tenable pluralist position” by providing a general model selection procedure (p. 
268), however, proves unsuccessful. One reason for this is that Rodrik does not 
intend to develop a complete account of model selection. As his account is thus 
intentionally incomplete and vague, it does not serve as a good foundation for Grüne-
Yanoff and Marchionni’s general selection model. 
Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni’s model consists of an “ordered tuple 
<A1,...,An,T,D> of assumptions A1,A2,...,An, theoretical base T, and derivational 
rules D” (p. 268). They argue that some models, such as the Sakoda-Schelling model 
of racial segregation,3 are not explicitly based on theory. I cannot make much sense 
of this claim, but there is certainly a sense in which some models are more theory-
light than others – not relying on the dominant theoretical assumptions within the 
field. This seems to be a better interpretation fitting with the assertion by Grüne-
Yanoff and Marchionni that the Sakoda-Schelling model “proceeds autonomously 
from any particular economic (or sociological) theory” (p. 268). I take it that their 
‘explicit’ (theoretical base) quantifier is intended to solve this issue. T can then consist 
of any concepts and assumptions, some of which Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni 
argue may have garnered strong evidential support. Similarly, for assumptions 
A1,A2,...,An, they can be supported by evidence. Here, they avoid having to deal with 
the now quite large literature on evidence in the philosophy of science and simply 
introduce evidence as “a set of propositions EK that lend support to a given 
assumption” (p. 269). 
 
3 Though usually referred to as the checkerboard model or Schelling model after Schelling (1971), 
Hegselmann (2017) elegantly showed that James Sakoda (1971) as a victim of the Matthew effect, 
deserves at least equal credit and recognition for his earlier development of the idea. 
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D on the other hand, includes logical and mathematical rules of inference: 
“such as modus ponens and mathematical techniques such as the identification of 
local maxima” in addition to “fallible inference rules such as statistical inferences 
drawn from simulation runs” (p. 268). This set of rules is too narrow, however, as it 
leaves out important facts about context. Much recent work in the philosophy of 
science suggests that we need to take the context of models more seriously in order 
to draw inferences between a model and its real-world target (see for instance Teller 
2001). This shortcoming will later reveal itself as the fundamental problem with 
Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni’s demand for a general selection procedure. Rodrik’s 
defense, however, is likewise not satisfying and a closer examination of Grüne-
Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) reveals why. 
In addition to the initial set-up, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni suggest a 
number of constraints in the model-selection process such that the possibly 
uncountable number of possible models M becomes limited, leading to a set of 
candidate models MC. Their primary concern is the idea of a model’s purpose. Models 
are used for different purposes and different purposes will determine which models 
are relevant and which aren’t. Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni see this relevancy 
criterion R as quite narrow, however. They assume that a model’s purpose will always 
include at least one input to output combination, such as the market price of a good 
and the policy of a price cap, thus offering something like a critical assumption. This 
does not mean that these relationships need already be part of the model, but that 
they can “be meaningfully introduced” and in which a change of the input variable 
has an effect on the relevant output variable (p. 268). While some may criticize this 
constraint as unrealistic, I see it as a useful and approximately true idealization in 
many cases of economic policy making. In any case, the point of their argument is to 
show that even if we have such a constraint there will be too many models left, 
making a choice impossible if we don’t introduce some further details and constraints 
into the model selection process. 
2.2 Modeling Selection Failure 
Having given the core of their model we can turn to their formal definition of an 
EoR, which occurs “if the number candidate models, MC, is not sufficiently 
constrained” (p. 273). This is where Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) demand 
the necessity of a general selection framework, which “will fail to reduce this 
multiplicity to a manageable number if the critical assumptions are underdetermined 
by the empirical evidence” (p. 274). They illustrate three different ways in which such 
a failure may occur. 
1. Robustness Analysis. Perhaps the primary way in which economics 
would become ‘flooded’ with an almost uncountable number of models would be to 
ignore the robustness of models. Here, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni worry that 
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robustness analysis will be unable to “sufficiently filter the number of models” (p. 
274). For this, they provide us with the following scenario: 
This might happen with economic models that are not derivationally robust: if 
in the extreme, all the assumptions in the models belonging to the set are 
crucial to the conclusions, then no model is discarded. Of course, the lack of 
robustness also raises doubts about the reliability of the models in the first 
place (cf. Cartwright, 2007; Grüne-Yanoff, 2011). 
– Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018, p. 274) 
As I shall later argue, the problem here rests ultimately in a misunderstanding of the 
role of robustness analysis in science. 
2. Lack of Empirical Evidence. In some policy decisions the 
evidence-base is scarce. This concerns rapidly occurring phenomena such as 
epidemiological events, like the Coronavirus outbreak in 2020, but also longstanding 
problems such as optimal education strategy. In educational design, for instance, we 
may have only sparse evidence on whether class size leads to better education 
(Stecher et al. 2001). Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) suggest that the problem 
of lacking evidence - i.e. an insufficient number of propositions EK supporting the 
model - may occur when we “are unable to experiment, or because of legal 
constraints on the data” (p. 274). In such situations, economists frequently invoke 
the robustness of their models. While they may be empirically underdetermined, they 
at least appear to be robust against a broad range of empirical assumptions. But this 
reply is simply an implicit endorsement of model pluralism. Grüne-Yanoff and 
Marchionni would have to pick their side: there is no important epistemological 
distinction between robustness analysis narrowly conceived and a much broader 
sense of robustness analysis. Here, we don’t rely on the selection of a particular 
model, but rather are interested in the connections between a broad range of models 
giving us purchase on a complex world. It is the diversity of models that matters, 
rather than a particular model (see Ylikoski and Aydinonat 2014; Veit 2019a). 
3. Pragmatic Limitations. The third reason they give for the 
occurrence of an EoR, are pragmatic considerations. When models are used and 
intended for policy purposes, there is an added time constraint that is due to urgency 
or lack of manpower. Policy-makers may not be able to delimit the number of 
relevant models even when they are not underdetermined by the empirical evidence 
and meet our robustness standards. Consider the ‘noise’ created by a multitude of 
empirical studies with contradictory results. In order to make an informed choice, we 
may have to consider them all, but this is often not possible given the practical 
constraints of policy making.  
While Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) recognize that Rodrik suggests a 
number of additional constraints himself, such as “narrative relevance, simplicity, 
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plausibility, reasonableness, and intuitiveness” (p. 268); these are largely left 
unspecified and thus do invite the charge that policy-makers will be faced with an 
EoR problem. 
3 Model Pluralism and the Embarrassment of Riches 
Despite the obvious shortcomings of Rodrik’s account, this section is intended to 
debunk the EoR argument. Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) argue that a 
necessary condition for the viability of model pluralism is that it is possible to “find a 
way of selecting, from amongst a plurality of models, the one that is right for a 
specific purpose” (p. 266). They also argue that “[i]f such a selection procedure were 
not available, and an arbitrary large number of models had to be considered adequate 
for a given target and purpose, then model pluralism would not be a viable position” 
(p. 273) at all. This, I shall argue, gets things backwards. 
The mistake here is twofold. First, it suggests that model pluralism is just one 
possible view of how success, progress, and the structure of science could be 
characterized. But if the proponents of ‘strong’ model pluralism (Veit 2019a) are 
correct, there is no alternative to model pluralism. Due to inherent trade-offs between 
the many aims of scientific models (Levins 1966; Weisberg 2003, 2006, 2013; 
Matthewson and Weisberg 2009) and their context-sensitive nature (Veit 2020), 
multiple models are a necessary feature for scientific progress. They are not just a 
sign of an immature phase of science - science itself operates by continuously 
expanding its ‘toolkit’ of available models, whether in ecology, climate science, or 
economics. Due to the complexity of the world and our cognitive limitations, model 
pluralism properly understood is both a factual claim about how science is practiced, 
and a normative one about how science ought to proceed. The second problem in 
Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) rests in the assertion that it will be possible to 
provide a general model selection framework. This, however, is wishful thinking. 
There is no way in which policy-makers could ‘do it by the book’. 
Before elaborating these two points, I would like to address a possible 
objection concerning the uncharitability with which Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni 
(2018) is treated here. Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni, after all, do not have the 
stronger model pluralism in mind that Veit (2019a) outlines in his “Model Pluralism” 
paper, nor the more moderate versions (see Aydinonat 2018a; Ylikoski and 
Aydinonat 2014) that seem to be able to withstand at least some of the brute force 
found in the EoR argument. They formulate model pluralism more narrowly as 
follows: “no model fits all situations” and “different models are right depending on 
the purpose to which they are put” (Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni 2018, p. 266). 
Nevertheless, given that they assert they are attracted to Rodrik’s pluralistic 
understanding of economics and modeling it seems at least awkward to suggest that 
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there is a problem for this position to overcome in order to be acceptable. Indeed, as 
a criticism of Rodrik, their arguments may very well be considered successful. As 
demonstrated in section 2, the original formulation of Rodrik is flawed in various 
respects, and Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni do well to point these out. Yet, we 
should also recognize that Rodrik never intended his alternative picture of economics 
to be a fully adequate one. His book is not to be taken as “treatise on economic 
methodology” (Rodrik 2018, p. 276). As such, we should be free to follow Aydinonat 
(2018a) and Veit (2019a) in their attempts to improve the idea of “model pluralism” 
for if they are correct, then there is a much bigger gem hidden in Rodrik’s embrace 
of model diversity – an idea that philosophers of science are well-advised to take 
seriously. If Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni’s arguments are successful, this is only to 
the extent that they take a naïve version of model pluralism as their starting point. 
But this view, as I shall demonstrate, fails to take seriously the more rigorous 
arguments for an embrace of model pluralism that have been offered elsewhere. 
3.1 Taking Model Pluralism Seriously 
What Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni see as a fatal flaw of model pluralism, 
Aydinonat (2018a) and Veit (2019a) see as its greatest strength. Yet, both sides call 
for a revision of Rodrik’s ideas in order to make them usable. Here, it might be useful 
to draw on a distinction I have previously drawn between strong, moderate and 
weekly moderate model pluralism (Veit 2019a).  
Strong model pluralism is the view I endorse and what I see as the natural endpoint 
of a continuing trend in the philosophy of science to paying more attention to the 
context of models: “For almost any aspect x of phenomenon y, scientists require 
multiple models to achieve scientific goal z” (Veit 2019a, p. 6). This position is 
considerably stronger than any other found in the literature, such as Weisberg (2013), 
Ylikoski and Aydinonat (2014), Potochnik (2017), and Aydinonat (2018b). These 
authors are defenders of moderate model pluralism: “There exists an aspect x of a 
phenomenon y such that scientists need multiple models to explain/predict x” 
(2019a, p. 6).  Finally, I have ascribed a weakly moderate model pluralism to Rodrik, 
Levins, and the large majority of philosophers engaged in the philosophy of models 
literature: “Each phenomenon has many different aspects, and scientists need 
different models to explain/predict these different aspects of a single phenomenon” 
(2019a, p. 6). Aydinonat thinks that moderate model pluralism is the most valuable 
contribution within Rodrik’s monograph, yet it is doubtful whether he ever defended 
such a view. While Rodrik (2018) admitted that “Aydinonat is right” and his 
monograph “is slippery on my preferred version” (p. 278), he does not seem to fully 
grasp the more nuanced points Aydinonat attempts to make, seemingly treating it as 
the mere stitching together of multiple models. But this is not what Aydinonat had 
in mind. 
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Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) give Aydinonat’s suggestions slightly 
more attention, considering his position as a footnote towards an alternative view on 
model pluralism: “[...]could also be interpreted as recommending the use of several 
models in the understanding of a specific target” asserting that a “more complicated 
version of our selection procedure could be employed to select the ‘right set of 
models’ for the purpose” (p. 274). But a general model selection framework will 
always fail, regardless of whether it is intended to provide a single model or a set of 
models. More importantly, however, I think that it is a mistake to treat a model-
selection framework for a set of models as a mere issue of scale. Selecting the model, 
and selecting the right set of models are different problems. The latter requires paying 
attention to the context and the relation between different models, a factor Grüne-
Yanoff and Marchionni largely omit in their paper. But if one takes the ‘family of 
models’ perspective seriously - whether in Ylikoski and Aydinonat (2014) or the 
‘population of models’ idea in Veit (2019a) - than it is in precisely these connections 
and context that we find the reason for why modeling in science is so strikingly 
successful even in the absence of a model-selection procedure. It is not merely a 
stitching together of models. It is thus not clear that their model of model selection 
can simply be extended to capture the actual pluralist views in the field.4 
Indeed, if one accepts the strong model pluralism in Veit (2019a, 2020), model 
pluralism can no longer be seen as a mere mode of investigation as more moderate 
views would have it (e.g. Aydinonat 2018a). It is a view about the nature of the world, 
science, and us as cognitively limited agents, in which pluralism isn’t just a strategy, 
but the only possible avenue for those who want to gain knowledge about the world 
(Veit forthcoming; Teller 2020; Pearce 2013). This form of pluralism can be 
understood as both an epistemological and a metaphysical thesis with close ties to the 
doctrine of perspectivism. While there is no agreed upon definition of perspectivism 
or perspectival pluralism, they all share the view that the world is too complex and 
our cognitive capacities too limited as to avoid a plurality of perspectives (see Veit 
and Browning 2020a). Pluralists, such as Giere (2006), Wimsatt (2007, 2012), Van 
Fraassen (2008), Massimi (2012), Chang (2012), Mitchell (2020), Teller (2020), and 
Veit (2019a, 2020) have long argued, that multiple scientific methods, models, 
experiments are a source of strength rather than a weakness. 
As metaphysical thesis, though this is an optional element, perspectival 
pluralism is located between the two extremes of metaphysical realism and anti-
realism in science (Massimi and McCoy 2020). Cartwright (2019) herself, who appears 
to be a major influence on Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni has expressed such a view 
in her recent monograph Nature, the Artful Modeler. She maintains that models are 
what makes science successful, while acknowledging that we have little grasp on how 
 
4 I thank one of my reviewers for convincing me to press Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) on 
this point in more detail. 
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to make sense of this metaphysically. She proposes to see nature itself as a modeler, 
who arranges the world in such a way as to make models epistemically successful. 
Talk of nature as modeler is best interpreted metaphorically (Veit forthcoming). If 
nature is understood as complex and ever-shifting, we should not expect that we 
could ever find a general model selection procedure that conceives of nature like a 
book of secrets - only to be revealed once we discover the right rules. Nature is not 
like a book for which we would just need to find the right model in order to translate 
its secrets into a form we can understand (see also Veit & Ney 2021 for the 
importance of metaphors in science).  
What pluralist views on models - such as those found in Ylikoski and 
Aydinonat (2014) and Veit (2019a) - point to is a certain kind of anarchism with 
respect to single models. In a previous paper on what I dubbed “model anarchism” 
(Veit 2020), I argue that we should not expect a philosophical analysis at the level of 
generality typical in many philosophical discussions, to successfully lead to useful 
generalizations across models. Both nature and the various entities and activities we 
call ‘models’ and ‘modeling’ are simply too complex and diverse as to allow such 
approaches to be successful. Ideas such as the notion of a ‘family of models’ (Ylikoski 
and Aydinonat 2014) and ‘population of models’ (Veit 2019a) are an attempt to 
highlight the complex relations we find between models and the world. The 
mappings between these domains are many-to-many and cannot be understood 
without taking the context-sensitive and pragmatic nature of what ‘modelers’, or 
rather all scientists, are engaged in into account. If we idealize away from this ‘messy’ 
nature of actual scientific practice our philosophical accounts are bound to be 
uninformative. Weisberg similarly alludes to Feyerabend when we are faced with the 
philosophical problem to make sense of the success of modeling practice: 
Just as theorists offer incomplete, idealized models of their targets, so must 
philosophers. Theoretical practice is rich and multilayered, and the world is 
often uncooperative. Paul Feyerabend’s dictum that “anything goes” in science 
often seems true of theoretical practice. [...] philosophical analysis will 
necessarily be partial and incomplete. 
– Michael Weisberg (2013, p. 6) 
If one takes such pluralist views on science seriously, Grüne-Yanoff and 
Marchionni’s demand for a general selection framework would almost appear as the 
assertion that science needs to solve the problem of choosing between diverse 
models for a specific purpose, for science itself to be tenable. But as Weisberg rightly 
notes, philosophical analysis on such a level of generality will necessarily be partial 
and incomplete. If model pluralists are correct, there will simply not be a non-pluralist 
alternative that isn’t likewise faced by the problem of choosing the right model. 
Under-determination is simply a feature of the complexity of nature and the scientific 
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activity we are engage in, which is precisely why we require a plurality of methods to 
deal with this complexity of the world. 
In a footnote, Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni state that the “availability of such 
a selection procedure is not sufficient to justify model pluralism. Even when the 
procedure successfully selects one model, or a manageable set of models, doubt 
remains whether the model so selected should be legitimately trusted for the purposes 
of prediction, explanation, and intervention” (p. 274). But even if one subscribes to 
the received view of economic modeling practice with a focus on case-studies of 
different singular models, it is unclear how the problem Grüne-Yanoff and 
Marchionni raise for model pluralism is a novel problem for science. Economists 
looking for the right ‘general’ model are still faced with the question of what the 
appropriate model is. In fact, if the arguments presented here are valid, the problem 
is much more severe for anti-pluralist views of modeling. Economists rarely discard 
models completely, but if the goal is to find one model that is supposed to satisfy 
diverse and mutually incompatible goals, such as simplicity and completeness, 
irrespective of the context, they are faced not with an embarrassment of riches, but 
with an embarrassment of impossibility. It is thus misleading to paint it as a problem for 
pluralism, since it is a problem for science itself. EoR cannot be overcome by 
dropping pluralism, since model pluralism itself arises out of the perspectivist 
recognition that we need the diversity of models to even begin to make sense of the 
world. If anything, model pluralism serves as a partial solution to this problem of 
diversity, by narrowing this ‘huge’ set of models down to a smaller set fitting the task 
at hand. 
3.2 Facing the Embarrassment of Impossibility 
The mistake in the EoR lies in the assumption that it is possible to provide a general 
model selection procedure. The goals for which models are put to use are too diverse 
to allow for a unified account of model selection. This does not entail a naive model 
anarchism in which ‘anything goes’ and policy-makers would be free to choose any 
model that they see fit, but rather points to a much more pluralist and context-
sensitive view that takes the tacit knowledge and practice of policy making seriously. 
Let us return to Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni’s three paths towards an EoR and 
illustrate how model pluralism turns the problem into an embarrassment of impossibility. 
1*. Robustness Analysis. In the case of robustness analysis, the EoR is the 
easiest to dissolve. Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni argue that the model selection 
problem needs to be solved in order for model pluralism to be viable. Yet, robustness 
analysis is merely a narrower form of model pluralism. Each change in a particular 
model creates a new one, with further changes and alterations creating a genuine 
genealogy of models. As the model pluralists argue, it is the very presence of this 
multiplicity of models that gives robustness analysis its strength (Ylikoski and 
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Aydinonat 2014; Aydinonat 2018b; Veit 2019a). Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni thus 
demand that model pluralism needs to apply model pluralism (in the sense of 
robustness analysis) in order to be viable. The problem is: there is no alternative to a 
reliance on a diversity of models, since science derives its strength, not its weakness, 
from the existence of an abundance of models. Lehtinen (2016, 2018), for instance, 
argues that we can gain indirect evidence for models through robustness analysis - 
thus undermining the idea that models always need to be underdetermined. It is 
precisely through the use of models with a wide range of different assumptions that 
we will get a better grip on the causal patterns of the world we are faced with. 
Robustness analysis is often misleadingly conceived as the confirmation of a 
particular model. However, it is not the individual model that matters, but rather the 
entire population it is part of (Veit 2019a). It is from a population of models that we 
make progress in understanding the complexity of the world, not just from a particular 
model. This is why it is a mistake to see a ‘failure’ of robustness analysis to determine 
a single model as an embarrassment of riches. The goal of selecting a single model is 
usually not the purpose of robustness analysis to begin with. 
2*. Lack of Empirical Evidence. Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni suggest 
that the lack of empirical evidence for models and their assumptions makes model 
pluralism particularly problematic. This, I think, gets things backwards. Models are 
not only underdetermined by the evidence when it is impossible to create a testing-
scenario for the model, or moral and legal constraints constrain our empirical 
investigations. Models are always underdetermined by the evidence. This is why model 
pluralism is needed to deal with the evidential uncertainty. Faced with an abundance 
of underdetermined models, it would be too high of an epistemic risk to put all our 
eggs in one basket and rely on only one model, since we will never have the kind of 
confidence in a single model that a general selection procedure would demand. This 
is not a problem for model pluralism, but again one for science more generally and is 
precisely the reason why we rely on robustness analysis. Model diversity is the only 
way to deal with this problem (see also Mitchell 2009), since it acknowledges this 
complexity of the real world. This is not to say that we will find easy solutions, but 
rather that we are actively trying to find models that map onto these complex 
relations instead of trying to find one general model that captures everything. 
3*. Pragmatic Limitations. While Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni’s final 
argument for the EoR was only a sidenote in the entirety of their paper, it is now the 
only remaining candidate. Here, however, again their argument is undermined by the 
goal of providing a general model selection framework. Pragmatics entirely depend 
on context – an issue that they deliberately chose to omit for the sake of their 
idealized model. But it is here that their idealization leads to a misrepresentation of 
actual scientific modeling practice. While they assert that they would address the EoR 
“from a more pragmatic perspective at the end of Section 5” (p. 266), they fail to do 
so in the end. Let us therefore conclude this paper by addressing this point ourselves. 
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4 Concluding Remarks 
In the last decades, philosophers of science have shifted much of their attention away 
from laws and towards models, modeling-practices, and model-based science. Much 
of this work, however, has been undertaken from a detached armchair position. 
Indeed, unfortunately little has been written on scientific modeling practices and the 
roles of models in policy making. Models, however - in particular in the social 
sciences - are often intended to inform and for use in public policy making. 
Perhaps, part of the avoidance among philosophers in engaging with the 
conceptual problems of model-based policy making, has rested in the naive idea that 
scientists are in the business of supplying policy-makers with the ONE true model, 
that they can then straightforwardly apply, i.e. ‘read off policies’. Due to the efforts 
of numerous philosophers of science, such as Douglas (2009) and Mitchell (2009), 
little if any credibility remains for this conception of the relation between modeler 
and policy-maker. The rapid proliferation of modeling practices within science raises 
the challenging question of how policy-makers should deal with the ever-growing 
number of models. Due to the incredible diversity of models, it is simply no longer 
possible for policy-makers to simply ‘read off’ the appropriate policies from science, 
if it ever was to begin with (Cartwright 2019; Veit forthcoming). There could never 
be a successful, yet context-free, model selection procedure. To idealize away from 
the context-sensitivity and relationships among models in order to achieve a general 
model of model selection, will necessarily lead to a sacrifice in realism and precision 
- something Levins has already pointed out in 1966. This does not prohibit the 
possibility of some useful heuristics in narrow cases such as epidemiological 
outbreaks, weather forecasts, or models for future economic crises, but these will 
always be context-dependent and need to be sensitive to the “values, judgments, and 
evaluations of an ethical, political, or practical nature” (Rodrik 2015, p. 211). 
 
How then should policy-makers use models in their practice? This is no easy 
task. But it is doubtful that an easy solution to this problem was ever on the table to 
begin with. Here we should follow Cartwright (2019), Rodrik (2015) and others, and 
see modeling as more of an art or craft, something that requires actual policy making 
experience, extensive background knowledge, and a number of often unarticulated 
skills in the implementation of models. Rodrik (2015) expresses this point elegantly: 
 
But as the science of trade-offs, economics deftly enlightens us on both sides of 
the ledger—the costs and benefits, the known and the unknown, the 
impossible and the feasible, the possible and the likely. Just as social reality 
admits a wide range of possibilities, economic models alert us to a variety of 
scenarios. Disagreements among economists are natural under the 
circumstances, and humility is the right attitude all around. It is better for the 
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public to be exposed to these disagreements and uncertainties than to be lulled 
into a false sense of confidence about the answers that economics provides. 
– Dani Rodrik (2015, p. 209) [italics added for emphasis] 
To make our model selection sensitive to realism and at the same time precise enough 
to actually narrow our choice of models will involve a sacrifice in generality. 
Economics as the science of trade-offs, should be sensitive to the necessary role of trade-
offs within modeling itself. Consider the analogy of a craftsman who receives calls to 
fix x. x could be anything, and every instance of it may substantially differ from 
others. Even if it seems initially appealing to provide a general selection procedure 
for electricians, plumbers, etc. to optimize their work, there is simply no such general 
framework that wouldn’t ultimately hinder rather than help the agents in action. 
While there might very well be a heuristic role for such frameworks for those who 
are starting to learn a craft, it should be considered a scaffold meant to be ultimately 
discarded. At this point, our able craftsman has developed a vast skillset of diverse 
methods, yet might never be able to list them all if asked to do so. We should not 
convey a false sense of confidence that the complexity of the phenomena economists study 
can simply be boiled down into a simple and general model-selection framework 
from which we could simply read off the appropriate model. Policy making isn’t 
about choosing the right model, it is about using the richness of economic models to 
make a call about the best possible policy.  
In his book, Rodrik discusses the illustrative case of the Nobel prize winner 
Jean Tirole, who left journalists frustrated by not being able to state the results of his 
research in a single sentence (pp. 209-210). There was not one big idea that brought 
everything together in a way that could satisfactorily summarize his work with a 
simple slogan. Instead, Tirole created a rich set of diverse models for a variety of 
problems, denying that railroads could be regulated in the same way as intellectual 
property. He took it to be an absurdly simplistic viewpoint of the nature of economic 
science that we could come up with a single model to satisfy all the purposes of policy 
making irrespective of context. The devil, as so often, lies in the details. In a paper 
with Ricardo Huasman and Andres Velasco, Rodrik demonstrates this pluralist way 
of doing economics by criticizing standard models for economic growth. They 
argued that in order to provide growth diagnostics, it is simply not enough to try “to 
come up with an identical growth strategy for all countries, regardless of their 
circumstances” (Hausmann et al. 2008, p. 326). This should not be taken as a signal 
for the great ingenuity of the modeler, but rather as a striking alarm bell that 
something is seriously wrong with it. Attention needs to be paid to the particular 
situation, history, and constraints faced by countries such as El Salvador, Brazil, and 
the Dominican Republic. The necessity of gathering empirical data about the 
particularities of the specific target systems simply precludes the possibility of 
developing a general model without losing much information as a result. 
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Clearly, there are limits to the extent to which policy-makers can rely on the 
diversity of models in economics. Individual economists can become specialized in a 
certain set of models, without undermining the essential tenet of model pluralism: 
that it is the entirety of models that truly matters. Rodrik thus urges economists to 
be more humble - to recognize how little they know and how specialized their 
knowledge really is, rather than push beyond their own limited expertise and give 
economics a bad reputation in the process (pp. 209-211). Economics, in many ways, 
should be considered a collective endeavor. It’s not the individual economist that 
matters but the discipline as a whole - and the same goes for the economic models 
they construct. An individual policy-maker, of course, neither has the luxury to have 
an overview of all of economics, nor to be specialized in a particular domain of 
economic research. But here we should similarly recognize that policymaking is not 
an individual feat. A complex network of agents is usually engaged in the decision 
process for every single policy. Social epistemologists have long highlighted the fact 
that such epistemic processes don’t occur on a mere individual level. The collective 
can make use of the knowledge and skills of the individuals involved. This is why 
diversity among actors in such a network is so beneficial. And it is the very same 
reason we should embrace a diversity of models - it is a necessary and unavoidable 
part of science as a human enterprise. This is why an expansion of our modeling 
toolkit should be seen as a measure of success, not a sign that something has gone 
seriously wrong. Ought implies can and Grüne-Yanoff and Marchionni (2018) fail to 
recognize that model pluralism, as a thesis about the nature of the world and the 
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